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Dr Yseult Marique 




1. More than half of the world population lives in cities nowadays. Because of the 
increasing population, density and mobility cities are facing unprecedented 
sustainability challenges. At the same time European local governments seek heartily to 
engage with the opportunities offered by technological evolutions including artificial 
intelligence, the Internet of Things and big data: they develop “smart cities”. These local 
projects take many different forms2. They have one major feature: they combine various 
mixes of digital technologies, artificial intelligence, accumulated and aggregated data 
about the environment and the people in this environment in order to change the way 
in which local government, local business and / or local citizens behave and make their 
decisions about their own interests and lives. This combination of technology and 
information in smart cities exercise thus a form of modern power on individuals’ lives. 
                                                 
1 Yseult Marique: University of Essex (United Kingdom) and FöV Speyer (Germany) 
(ymarique@essex.ac.uk); Steven Van Garsse, University of Hasselt and University of Antwerp (Belgium) 
(steven.vangarsse@uhasselt.be). All internet links have last been consulted on XX November 2018. 
2 For illustrations of these forms in England and Belgium, see: “Setting up public-private partnerships in 
smart cities – An exploration of legal techniques and some challenges”, in The Future of Administrative Law 
(LexisNexis, forthcoming).  
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2.
The ways in which this power is generated, implemented and monitored cause political 
and social controversy. 
 
2. These lively debates bring to the fore an age-old distinction, that of the 
public/private divide, and the allocation of different spheres of action and regulation 
among public and private actors. Smart cities are feared to lead to the privatization of 
the public space.3 Indeed embracing this digital evolution in smart cities requires 
cooperating and partnering with private enterprises, civil society organizations and 
citizens.  
 
3. A fundamental feature of smart cities needs to be acknowledged: i.e. the 
multiplicity of actors and the need to develop a legal umbrella for a range of fluid 
relationships among them, where the cooperation and interactions between the project 
members evolve over time. Indeed, putting at the center of a project “innovation” and 
“innovative ideas” is in itself more indeterminate than procuring the building of a bridge 
linking A to B. What is at stake with the ways in which smart cities bring together public 
and private actors to develop and implement technologies that shape citizens’ behavior 
and optimize public services is that the role allocation between the public and the 
private actors is dauntingly unclear: who is actually taking policy decisions or individual 
decisions in local government? Who is actually managing local issues? And according to 
                                                 
3 S. Ranchordas, “Citizens as Consumers in the Data Economy: The Case of Smart Cities”, (2018) 4 Journal 
of European Consumer and Market Law (forthcoming); S. Ranchordas, “Law and Autonomous Systems 
Series: Cities as Corporations? The Privatization of Cities and the Automation of Local Law”, 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/04/law-and-autonomous-systems-series-cities-
corporations-privatization. 
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which legal principles? Are they the public bodies? The economic partners? Do their 
perceptions of who is in charge match the legal framework and especially the legal 
protections available to citizens?  
 
4. When it comes to the discussions about how smart cities are a framework where 
power gets diffused, we touch upon administrative law and the rule of law, two aspects 
that scholarship starts to discuss. The need to ensure an appropriate degree of 
transparency about the working of smart cities, their decision-making processes and 
their algorithms becomes increasingly stressed.4 For instance, Oswald analyses how the 
duty to give reasons should be reconciled with smart cities.5 For Hildebrandt, an 
element of contestability of the decisions needs to be reintroduced: this means 
adversarial debates between the different actors involved in the production of 
decisions, which include experts, policy-makers and the people who suffer the direct 
and indirect effects of these decisions.6 We are closed to the right to be heard, famously 
at the heart of administrative decision-making.7   
 
5. Building on this strand of analysis, this explorative paper maps the role of the 
law in organizing public private relationships in smart cities. Administrative law is not 
                                                 
4 R. Brauneis and E. Goodman, “Algorithmic transparency for the smart city”, (2018) 20 Yale Journal of Law 
and Technology, 103; S. Ranchordas and A. Klop, “Data-driven regulation and governance in smart cities”, 
in A. Berle, V. Mak, E. Tjong Tjin Tai (eds), Research Handbook on Data Science and Law (Edward Elgar, 2018, 
forthcoming). Transparency of algorithms is even enshrined in the French Digital Republic Act 2016 (Art. 
L311-3-1 Code des relations entre le public et l’administration). 
5 M. Oswald, “Algorithm-assisted decision-making in the public sector: Framing the issues using 
administrative law rules governing discretionary power” (2018) Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 376: 20170359. 
6 M. Hildebrandt, “Algorithmic regulation and the rule of law”, (2018) Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 376: 20170355. 
7 G. Della Cananea, Due Process of Law beyond the State (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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only functional, i.e. it does not only provide solutions to economic, social or 
environmental needs. It is also instrumental and organizational. It conveys specific 
values related to how power can be exercised in a given society8 and how governments 
and their public services can be organized. It will be argued that the key role that the 
law has to play in relation to regulating public private relationships in smart cities 
relates to ensuring that no party can hide behind a veil of ignorance to escape the 
consequences of a project that has soured. Administrative law’s peculiar role in this 
regard hinges around the public/private divide: firstly, it has to ensure a good local 
governance in the interest of the local population; secondly, it has to ensure a level-
playing field to the private actors interested in being involved in smart city projects. 
How these two roles are organized and coordinated is continually being reshaped. 
Smart cities are the most recent illustration of this on-going process of experimentation. 
 
6. Overall, these roles played by the law require that agency and ascription of 
decisions need to be clear in smart city projects. Projects and programs need to be well 
structured and carefully prepared. Relationships between public and private actors 
need to be cleverly, “smartly” even, structured within legal constraints: public bodies 
are the entities that have to give account for the success and failures of smart cities: they 
need to ensure they have the resources, structures and expertise to follow up how smart 
cities are working in practice: they cannot delegate the very core of their functions (i.e. 
the pursuit of the local interest) to private actors. They can delegate some aspects of 
                                                 
8 P. Cane, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Clarendon Law Series, 2011, 5th edn) chapter 20. 
Draft for the Conference Transforming Cities with AI: Law, Policy, and Ethics, 23rd November 2018, London 
Any comments welcome – Please do not circulate 
 
5.
these functions but eventually their ultimate loyalty due to their constituents, as 
provided for in the law, is non-delegable.9 
 
7. This paper reads as follows. Section II explains the general interplays between 
the law, public private relationships and smart cities.10 The following sections map these 
interplays between public and private actors, leaving aside the role played by citizens. 
Citizens matter very much in smart cities but they usually are at the receiving end of the 
projects.11 However, this papers focuses on three steps in the making of smart city 
projects where the role allocation between public and private actors are unclear. Section 
III analyses how public and private parties (can) communicate with each other and 
draws attention to the relevance of legal rules in shaping their interactions. Section IV 
analyses ways in which public actors support the development of smart cities and their 
legal translation. Section V maps the procurement routes available to public actors 
                                                 
9 The extent to which delegation may be possible is related to the nature of the relationships between local 
bodies and their local population, which varies from country to country. In some legal systems, such as 
France (article 72 Constitution) or Belgium (article 162 alinea 2 Constitution), local autonomy (and 
accountability) is constitutionally enshrined. In England, local governance is connected to the stewardship 
and spending of taxpayers’ money (see J. Barratt, “Public Trusts”, (2006) (69:4) Modern Law Review, 514-
542; HM Treasury, Managing public money (2013 with annexes revised at March 2018), 53). J.S. Mill’s ideas 
that local government only have to make sure that local needs are provided for (and not that local 
government have to provide for these local needs themselves) remain pervasive in modern English local 
government. The lack of constitutional protection for local tasks has been lamented in English scholarship 
(S. Bailey and M. Elliott, “Taking local government seriously: Democracy, autonomy and the Constitution”, 
(2009) (68:2), Cambridge Law Journal, 436-472). 
10 See also for a brief overview: M. Milenković, M. Rašić and G. Vojković, “Using Public Private Partnership 
models in smart cities– proposal for Croatia” (2017) MIPRO, 1656-1661 (available at 
https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/887383.Using_Public_Private_Partnership_models_in_smart_cities.pdf.  
11 In some instances, citizens act as co-creators in smart cities. However, they then may behave like start-
ups, small economic actors. For the limited purpose of this paper, other roles are not considered: it would 
bring us into querying whether in some cases representative structures are not giving way to deliberative 
democratic structures. Although smart cities can be connected to these developments, most examples we 
have encountered bring smart cities more clearly into the classic realm of representative local democracy.  
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engaging in smart cities; with a special focus on the development of public-private 
vehicles for managing smart cities. Conclusions are drawn in section VI.  
 
II. Law, public-private relationships and smart cities 
 
8. No universally accepted definition of what a “smart city” is exists. The EU defines 
“smart cities” as”a place where the traditional networks and services are made more 
efficient with the use of digital and telecommunication technologies, for the benefit of its 
inhabitants and businesses.”12 This broad definition lies at the heart of the European 
Union’s investment “in ICT research and innovation and developing policies to improve 
the quality of life of citizens and make cities more sustainable in view of Europe's 20-20-
20 targets.”13 
 
9. Overall, smart cities are local projects often characterized by the creation of 
networks with sensors; the generation of data, real time data streams, mining of data, 
interconnection to things and people, use of networked infrastructure to improve 
efficiency, improvement of processes, real time monitoring of things like traffic, air, 
water or soil. However, smart cities are not only projects dealing with material aspects 
such as technological development and expansion.14 The umbrella concept “smart city” 
does not only refer to a context characterized by an integration between infrastructure 
and technology. It goes further to point towards the  creation of a general (institutional, 
economic, organizational or socio-cultural) context where (local) government and 
                                                 
12 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/smart-cities. 
13 Ibid. 
14 A. Castelli, “Smart Cities and Innovation Partnership”, (2018) EPPPL, 210. 
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private (economic and non-economic) actors rely on infrastructure, and technology to 
enable social innovation and hence pursue the general improvement of life’s quality 
over a local space.15 Smart cities are organizational means of local governance. They 
seek to address existing local societal issues through the development of local 
governance structures that reflect strategically on these issues: they aim to think 
forward and plan differently their local policies. In responding speedily to changing 
local needs, smart cities would facilitate the coming of a form of responsive decision-
making.16 
 
10. Smart cities are revolving around two main drivers in local decision-making: 
firstly, efficiency (and especially speed) and secondly, economy in the sense of cost 
savings and better resources allocation for cash-strapped local authorities.17 For 
instance, in being more accurately informed of the changing patterns of commuters over 
time, local authorities may gain the necessary evidence to extend a metro line. In better 
anticipating statistical features of their population, local authorities may be in a better 
position to know when to reduce – and maybe close down – social services. According 
to this approach, smart cities contribute to a better management of local resources 
(infrastructure, staff, service provisions). This would also apply to real time and 
predictive policing.18  
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 For responsiveness as a standard in public contracting, see P. Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting 
- Regulation, Responsiveness, Relationality (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
17 For the dire situation of local finances in England: NAO, Financial sustainability of local authorities 2018, 
2018 ; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/27/english-councils-warn-worst-is-yet-to-
come-on-cuts. 
18 See other contributions to this conference (xx); add L. Edwards, “Privacy, security and data protection in 
smart cities: a critical EU law perspective“, (2016) European Data Protection Law Review, 28–58. 
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11. Hence, smart cities and their algorithms may inform directly the way in which 
local bodies exercise their discretion and fulfil their legal duties. Smart cities may go 
further and lead to “algorithmic” regulation whereby decisions pertaining to the local 
issues are more or less generated directly through algorithms. The scope of human or 
organizational agency can become very narrow and/or elusive. Here power and 
decision-making are no longer in the hands of identifiable local power-holders: they 
have shifted – through the black box of the technology – to the diffuse networks of 
multiple public and private actors all partly in charge of little sequences of the wider 
chain of innovative technologies.19 This leads to a traditional question in (English) 
administrative law of how administrative discretion is embedded in constraints, either 
legal, normative or technological constraints. Smart cities are not only a tool to make 
individually idiosyncratic decisions on the rights of one individual citizen to access a 
parking for disabled people at 10:00 all Fridays of 2019. They are structuring political 
decisions for whole classes of local citizens for the foreseeable future. Legality 
requirements meet efficiency requirements.  
 
12. Furthermore, smart cities require specific expertise and money. Expertise 
would come mostly from academic institutions and money will be leveraged by private 
actors. This leads to developing “public private partnerships” (PPPs), a concept used 
since the early 1990s to describe arrangements whereby the public and the private 
sectors bring together their respective skills in order to deliver complex public projects. 
The World Bank defines broadly PPPs, as “[a] long-term contract between a private party 
                                                 
19 For the diffusion of liability in contractual networks of any kinds, see e.g. G. Teubner, Networks as 
connected contracts (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011). 
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and a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party 
bears significant risk and management responsibility and remuneration is linked to 
performance”.20 The Global Innovation Index’s definition is equally broad, namely that 
PPP is “a relationship in which public and private resources are blended to achieve a goal 
or set of goals judged to be mutually beneficial both to the private entity and to the 
public.”21  
 
13. PPPs tend to appear in the management toolbox22 when three factors are coming 
together: complexity, innovation and partnership.23 Firstly, the complexity24 is 
pervasive in smart cities : many public documents flag up that the scales of the societal 
issues in local government (in terms of pollutions, traffic, safety etc.) makes it 
challenging, even close to impossible, for one single organization to have all the 
necessary resources (in terms of staff, knowledge, money) to address these societal 
issues.25 Secondly, innovative solutions are needed to address these complex problems. 
                                                 
20 World Bank, Public-Private Partnerships Reference Guide, v.3.0,  2017 
(https://pppknowledgelab.org/guide/sections/1). 
21 L. Witters, R. Marom and K. Steinert, “The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving Innovation”, The 
Global Innovation Index 2012, 81. 
22 For an analysis of PPPs as tools, see: L. Salamon, The tools of government – A guide to the new governance, 
(Oxford University Press, 2002); C. Hood and H. Margetts, The tools of government in the digital age 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
23 Y. Marique, Public-Private Partnerships and the Law – Regulation, Institutions and Community 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 140-146. 
24 For an overview of the scientific community dedicated to researching “complex systems”, see 
https://cssociety.org/community. 
25 For instance: “how an ancient model of collaboration—the public-private partnership—is being applied in 
novel ways to address some of the large-scale challenges faced today. The reality is that no organization— no 
government, company, research institution, or nongovernmental organization (NGO)—by itself can solve our 
biggest problems, such as the economic crisis facing Europe or the massive emerging ecological threats. They 
must partner. They must collaborate.” (B. Verwaayen, “Embracing New Types of Partnerships to Drive Open 
Innovation”, The Global Innovation Index 2012, p. vii). 
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Finally, these can only be generated thanks to a coalition or a bundling of forces among 
actors having different skills. So, in smart cities, public authorities initiate and support 
clusters of actors coming from the industry, academia, local organizations, citizens etc.26 
These clusters are the seedbeds of knowledge creation.  
 
14. The overall focus of PPPs in smart cities is to help overcome the extreme 
fragmentation / compartmentalisation that has become generalized across 
organizations, being in (local) government, in the industry and in academia – where 
many decisions tend to be streamlined and standardized, in ways often detached from 
the reality.27 Once questions escape the neat tick box exercise or the swap discrete 
transaction of tit-for-tat, hence once questions require a longer-term approach, with 
various reflective cycles, different decision-making pathways are required. This is 
exactly what happens with smart cities where addressing issues connected to over-
crowding, over-consumption and depletion of basic resources need a long-term view to 
develop sustainable solutions, hence long-term funding and commitment from many 
actors. This commitment is achieved by identifying strategic opportunities and pressing 
problems that are specific to the city and delivering attractive benefits in the short term. 
This means that a level of bundling of skills and resources is needed. Smart cities, 
through their ICT systems and dashboards, allow for integrating their management and 
their development over time.  
 
                                                 
26 L. Witters, R. Marom and K. Steinert, “The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving Innovation”, The 
Global Innovation Index 2012, p. 82. 
27 A. Castell, A. Gregory, G. Hindle, M. James and G. Ragsdell (eds), Synergy Matters - Working with Systems 
in the 21st Century (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999). 
Draft for the Conference Transforming Cities with AI: Law, Policy, and Ethics, 23rd November 2018, London 
Any comments welcome – Please do not circulate 
 
11.
15. However, PPPs have long attracted polarized discussions both at the level of 
principles and of detailed implementation. At the level of principles, PPPs are seen as a 
potential channel towards  privatization.28 Democratic risks can also be identified as 
public bodies need to be on top of the matters: they need to understand their own 
commitments (not only in the short term leading up to next elections but also in the 
longer term), they need to maintain political accountability29 and they need to set up the 
appropriate procedures and systems to control and monitor the ways in which PPPs 
work. 
 
16. At the level of implementation, the PPPs developed in the 1990s and 2000s were 
most often set up in relation to infrastructure and real estate projects. This led to the 
emergence of detailed standards contracts and the setting up of dedicated units in 
central government to help negotiate these detailed contracts.30 The procedures 
supporting the monitoring of their performance remain fraud with problems.31 In any 
                                                 
28 E.g.: F. Miraftab, “Public-Private Partnerships – The Trojan Horse of Neoliberal Development?”, (2004) 
(24:1) Journal of Planning Education and Research, 89-101.  
29 For a discussion of accountability in PPPs, see N. Meletiadis, Public Private Partnerships and Constitutional 
Law – Accountability in the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Routledge, forthcoming). Also 
T. Willems and W. Van Dooren, “Multiple accountabilities in public-private partnerships (PPPs) : How to 
unravel the accountability paradox?”, in T. Christensen (eds) The Routledge handbook to accountability and 
welfare state reforms in Europe (Routledge, 2017), 1-12. 
30 Y. Marique, Public-Private Partnerships and the Law – Regulation, Institutions and Community 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) chapter 2 (for the situation in England). Also A. Akintoye, e.a. (eds.), Public 
private partnerships : A global review (Routledge, 216) 432p. 
31 E.g. : NAO, Projects leaving the Government Major Projects Portfolio, 2018. This report deals with the 
management of major and complex projects, regardless on their technical names. These projects fall within 
four categories: Government transformation and service delivery, infrastructure and construction, ICT and 
military capability. The arrangements supporting smart cities could easily fall within any of the first three 
categories. The report mentions for instance the “super-connected cities” programme (which run between 
2013 and 2015 to help funding broadband connections to SMEs in a range of cities) 
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case, the standard contracts developed for these real estate projects do not meet the 
legal questions arising in smart cities and legal scholarship is only now starting to 
contemplate the legal implications of PPPs when used in smart city projects.32 Of 
particular interest here is the ways in which PPPs can offer a flexible structure able to 
respond to the fast changing technology used in smart city projects.33   
 
17. This paper unpacks the incremental shaping of the decision-making process 
leading up to the smart city partnerships and how content is injected progressively into 
them. It isolates three significant “grey areas” or stages shaping these arrangements: 
initial discussions (III.), (intermediate) support offered by public bodies to private 
actors (IV) and the selection of the procurement route leading up to a formal working 
relationship where private partners are commissioned to provide services to civil 
servants and citizens (V).  
                                                 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-broadband-
investment/2010-to-2015-government-policy-broadband-investment). 
32 Most of the literature dedicated to smart cities is generated by computer sciences and communication 
sciences (e.g. G.S. Peña and N. Jędrzej, Between antidiscrimination and data: understanding human rights 
discourse on automated discrimination in Europe, (2018) LSE), urban planning and sociology (e.g. L. Mora, 
R. Bolici and M. Deakin, “The First Two Decades of Smart-City Research: A Bibliometric  Analysis”, (2017) 
(24:1) Journal of Urban Technology, 3-27; A.-M. Valdez and M. Cook, “Roadmaps to utopia: Tales of the smart 
city” (2018) (55:15) Urban Studies, 3385–3403). 
33 In a way this approach dates back to the HM Treasury, Enterprise & Growth Unit, Selling into Wider 
Markets: A Policy Note for Public Bodies, 2002, where PPPs were used to support the development of “wider 
markets opportunities”, i.e. finding ways in which public bodies could “make better use of their assets by 
engaging in commercial services based on them” (see p. 5). 
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III. First challenge: exploring the scene and identifying the main relevant actors and 
possible solutions 
 
18. The first challenge for the public and private actors is to set up the scene for the 
would-be “smart city”: who are the main players relevant to tackle the societal needs 
that the smart city seeks to address? What can they bring to the project? How? IT law 
consultants know this preliminary step well when it comes to negotiating major IT 
outsourcing deals. In Davies’ words,  
 
“the biggest difference and challenge for the negotiation of a multi-jurisdictional outsourcing 
is often to my mind bridging the cultural, linguistic and behavioural gaps as well as addressing 
the legal differences that are inevitable when a number of countries and regions are involved. 
Even in a single country outsourcing there will be different attitudes and approaches which 
will be encountered and need to be dealt with in order to reflect the different interests and 
priorities of the parties”.34  
 
19. Smart cities may be deceptive here: are we not talking about “local” government 
trying to address local issues? Yes, but the public and private actors in these projects 
have different experiences and backgrounds.35 For instance, the private actors are often 
international firms such as Sidewalk Labs (Google), Cisco, Siemens, Huawei, Nokia or 
Dell. In a way, public and private actors starting a discussion about a smart city have to 
choose each other: they need to be right for the type of endeavor they want to develop.36 
This section analyses the content of this step in terms of setting the right conditions 
                                                 
34 C. Davies, “Multi-cultural IT outsourcing contracts”, 2016, Communications Law 8-11, 8.   
35 E.g.: MRUK, Future City Glasgow – Evaluation,  sd, pp. 41 and 93.  
36 F. Sandulli, A. Ferraris and S. Bresciani, “How to select the right public partner in smart city projects”, 
(2017) (47:4) R&D Management, 607-619 mention that some cities claim to be “smart” or to want to be 
smart without really meeting basic requirements towards this project. The authors suggest three tests for 
selection, i.e. partner complementarity, commitment and compatibility. 
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enabling trust among actors. It then turns to exploring the legal requirements that apply 
to the actors during this step and to reviewing some of the main expressions that this 
step can take with their main features and challenges. 
 
20. A space for exchanging, testing and elaborating ideas is needed. Sharing 
information and data, discussing, the state of the art and current developments in the 
related sector, discussing new solutions for complicated problems lies at the heart of 
smart city projects implementing new technology and innovative ideas. The advantages 
of discussion with market parties are manifold: they raise problem awareness, help 
exchanging knowledge, allow better insights on the market about state-of-the-art 
technologies and on-going developments, increase interactions to fine tune demand, 
check the viability of potential solutions and associated risks.  
 
21. Trust among all the actors involved is needed for developing successfully smart 
cities and their innovative components. On the one hand, private actors can only provide 
relevant products and services if they fully understand the needs of the public actors to 
be addressed. They need to have an accurate diagnostic of the problem (data, objective 
evidence etc.) so that they can build their systems on a robust basis and not quick sand. 
On the other hand, public actors need to trust that the private actors are looking for 
ways to help them address local problems: public actors may be wary of legal risks (such 
as a legal challenge by competitors or citizens, oversight by competition / regulatory 
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agencies etc.) and be worried that their private counter-parts seek to capture them into 
lucrative agreements, detached from the general interest.37 
 
22. It is crucial for local government to assess how they can engage in dialogues and 
interactions with the market and how the law is regulating those interactions to 
preserve a free and undistorted competition on the market and to protect fundamental 
principles such as the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Legal requirements 
frame the options available for parties, sometimes preventing forms of exchanging 
communication they may feel would be fruitful in their specific circumstances or 
requiring resource-intensive and time-consuming procedures. Regulation and legal 
techniques may therefore be felt as a hindrance, but it is also an opportunity. Rules can 
be beneficial and enhance legal certainty and trust as they can  protect trade secrets and 
intellectual property. Legal rules also protect the interests of consumers and market 
parties for example against anti-competitive behavior, market collusion and distortion 
of competition. 
 
23. Whereas the exchange of information between private players can trigger legal 
issues from competition law perspective,38 exchange of information between public and 
                                                 
37 Cf. Smart cities vs. “locked-in” cities, https://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/135237_en.html; T. Casey, V. 
Valovirta, I. Heino, J. Porkka, V. Kotovirta and S. Ruutu, Interoperability Environment for Smart Cities 
(InterCity) Report of Phase 2 – Smart City Interoperability Environment Concept, 
https://www.vtt.fi/sites/InterCity/en/Documents/InterCity_Report_Phase_2_FINAL.pdf. 
38 For instance in terms of cartel and bid-rigging (see OECD, Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in 
Public Procurement, 2012). CJEU, Case C-8/08, 4 June 2009, T-Mobile Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, 
[59]: “Depending on the structure of the market, the possibility cannot be ruled out that a meeting on a 
single occasion between competitors, […] may, in principle, constitute a sufficient basis for the participating 
undertakings to concert their market conduct and thus successfully substitute practical cooperation 
between them for competition and the risks that that entails.” See also art. Article 101 alinea 1 TFEU that 
Draft for the Conference Transforming Cities with AI: Law, Policy, and Ethics, 23rd November 2018, London 
Any comments welcome – Please do not circulate 
 
16.
private sectors falls within a “grey” area, in the sense that the law does not organize 
directly any specific procedure as such. Local bodies are entitled to seek information 
about their local issues as best as they can so that their needs are better identified and 
their decision-making towards addressing them as accurate as possible.39 This helps 
local government to act professionally in their commercial relationships and indeed to 
be prepared and well aware of the issues that may arise along the road. In many ways 
this professional mindset is also to the benefit of economic actors who are then clearer 
about what they are expected to provide and more confident that the local authority is 
committed to deliver the smart city project so that the time and money invested in 
preliminary discussions are not wasted. 
 
24. Concretely, local bodies can ask experts for advice or consult local citizens or 
organizations. They can also gather information about the market solutions available. 
In some cases, they even have to do so. For instance, the (Public Service) Social Value Act 
2012 in England requires local bodies to consider the value they can secure for their 
area when buying services at the pre-procurement stage. This means that they need to 
                                                 
prohibits as incompatible with the internal market a range of practices, including “those which: (a) directly 
or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, 
markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.” However, special rules apply when it comes practices and cooperation 
involving to research and development (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 
on the application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU to certain categories of R&D 
agreements.  https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/rd-agreements-and-eu-competition-law-when-
can-companies-be-safe/ ).  
39 This leads to the field of “evidence-based decision making” as a way to produce “good decisions”. 
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consider how the services they are going to buy may improve the economic, social or 
environmental well-being of the area, how they may secure this improvement and 
whether they should consult on these issues. In other cases, consultation can be 
encouraged as a way to seek early engagement of all players towards the development 
of new local policies. In its LEAN approach adopted in 2012, the UK central government 
recommended extended early market discussions (and even “boot camp”-type of 
discussions) in order to reduce the timescales and the costs of procurement.40 And 
indeed, in some cases, the exchange of information is the first step in setting up a 
commercial relation and setting up a procurement procedure.  
 
25. Interactions between the public and private actors prior to the procurement are 
looked upon suspiciously. Indeed, procurement law starts from the idea that all market 
parties should have equal chances to obtain the contract. If the public bodies have 
already had contact with some market players, these interactions may have biased them 
about what they need and how they can meet these needs thanks to available solutions 
on the markets. Prior discussions shape how public actors design their procurement so 
that they are no longer open to all possible goods or services that may exist on the 
market. The law seeks to ensure a level-playing field between market participants, 
trying to avoid any distortion of competition. This is even more important in projects as 
smart cities where contracts with public bodies may be crucial for new entrants to 
access this burgeoning market and where the current discussions may strongly 
contribute to shaping the structure of smart cities and of available technologies in the 
                                                 
40  Procurement Policy Note, Procurement Supporting Growth: Supporting Material for Departments, Action 
Note 04/12 9May 2012, Annex C.  
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future. This approach also matters for public bodies that need to be aware of potential 
interoperability issues in the future that selecting some technologies may bring to the 
fore.41 
 
26. In order to clarify this kind of conundrum, the EU sought to modernize its 
procurement framework the last decade with the view to enabling innovation, smart 
growth and its Europe 2020 agenda.42 The current public procurement directives 
provide four tools in this respect. First, they created a new tender procedure integrating 
innovation into the procedure itself. Secondly they reaffirmed the use of a tender 
procedure integrating market consultations.43 Thirdly, they clarified expressis verbis 
that preliminary market consultations are allowed.44 However, these consultations 
cannot distort competition or lead to a violation of the principles of non-discrimination 
and transparency. More broadly, local governments need to respect the Treaty for the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) principles. Hence, the principle of equality 
and proportionality also need to be complied with so that competition among economic 
                                                 
41 Everybody has heard of stories about an organisation that had to find ways to escape an old IT system to 
keep up with upgrading services, merging with other organisations or collaborating with sister 
organisations. For examples see e.g. A. King and I. Crewe, The Blunders of Our Governments (Oneworld 
Publications, 2013). 
42 European Commission, Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy – Towards a 
more efficient European Procurement Market, Brussels, 27.1.2011, COM(2011) 15 final. Section 3.2 drew the 
attention of procurers on the shape of existing markets and the risks to aggravate non-competitive markets. 
It concluded on “All measures aiming at enhancing competition in procurement markets presuppose that 
contracting authorities have a good knowledge of the markets on which they purchase (e.g. via studies on the 
structure and shape of the targeted market prior to the actual procurement).” (p. 31). 
43 This paper comes back on this point in the section discussing the competitive dialogue and innovation 
partnership (see below, paragraphs 4746 and 4847-4948). 
44 See for example article 40 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC. 
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actors is not distorted.45 Fourthly, article 41 of the directive 2014/24 regulates the prior 
involvement of candidates or tenderers who have advised local government during the 
preparation of a procurement procedure. In that case, the contracting authority “shall 
take appropriate measures to ensure that competition is not distorted by the participation 
of that candidate or tenderer”. These measures “include the communication to the other 
candidates and tenderers of relevant information exchanged in the context of or resulting 
from the involvement of the candidate or tenderer in the preparation of the procurement 
procedure”. Exclusion of a candidate or tenderer is an extreme measure that is only 
required if there is no less drastic way to ensure equality between economic actors.46 
Article 41 therefore leaves a wide margin of appreciation to local bodies to decide how 
best to design their preliminary discussions and procurement to ensure that 
competition is not distorted.   
 
27. Overall, the EU procurement directive mainly implies that any early market 
engagement and dialogue need to be undertaken with due regard to the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality and equal treatment. Its objective is 
to protect competition between private actors so that the local government can benefit 
from this competition when it comes to designing the commercial relationships 
underpinning the smart city projects. In practice, local government have developed a 
range of more or less formal ways to organize this early market engagement. Among the 
less formal routes are for instance the organization of workshops and information 
                                                 
45 O. Pantilimon Voda and C. Jobse, “Rules and Boundaries Surrounding Market Consultations in Innovation 
Procurement: Understanding and Addressing the Legal Risks”, (2016) EPPPL 179. 
46 “Prior to any such exclusion, candidates or tenderers shall be given the opportunity to prove that their 
involvement in preparing the procurement procedure is not capable of distorting competition.” 
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meetings, intermediate platforms and open networks, or the use of ‘matchmakers’.47 As 
these practices are mostly informal they fall in a really grey area where issues of equality 
and transparency could easily arise.   
 
28. On the other hand, local government can also develop a formal market 
consultation. Such market consultation is open to the entire market: all potentially 
interested economic operators receive equal chances in presenting their ideas and 
participating in the discussions. The starting point of the market consultation is most 
often an effective advertising strategy including publishing the notice at national level 
and the dissemination of the upcoming market dialogue in relevant local and 
international journals and the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) by means 
of publication of a Prior Information Notice (PIN) in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED).48  
 
29. A market consultation document is drafted and spread mentioning the desires 
for outcome, challenges and questions for the market actors. This document also 
mentions the rules for participating in the market dialogue and the way market parties 
are allowed to express their interest in participating in the market consultation and 
overall expectations of the local government involved. To be successful, such formal 
                                                 
47 https://www.ktn-uk.co.uk/   and https://eu-smartcities.eu/ 
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market consultation requires sufficient time planning and effective resource 
allocation.49  
 
30. Fair competition entails that all market operators are given the same 
opportunities and an equal amount of information, knowledge and support not only 
during the market consultation, but also afterwards in a procurement procedure 
following the market consultation. To guarantee those principles good practice would 
recommend that local governments collect all information received, keep records and 
publish a summary of the input received by market parties following the market 
consultation. In that way, this grey zone prior to the actual decisions shaping the smart 
city projects becomes a bit less grey. Accountability is made easier in the follow up of 
the project. 
 
31. In case of a subsequent procurement procedure, local governments should take 
measures in line with article 41 of the directive 2014/2450 and avoid that the 
procurement procedure is biased towards a specific economic operator or towards a 
specific technology. Local governments need to share information with all the market 
players who are interested (whether they participated in the market consultation or 
not) to take part in the procurement, while also employing their best efforts to protect 
commercially sensitive information.51 One way of doing this is by attaching the 
summary of the market consultation to the tender documents and by fixing reasonable 
                                                 
49 O. Pantilimon Voda and C. Jobse, “Rules and Boundaries Surrounding Market Consultations in Innovation 
Procurement: Understanding and Addressing the Legal Risks”, (2016) EPPPL 180-181. 
50 See above paragraph 26. 
51 O. Pantilimon Voda and C. Jobse, “Rules and Boundaries Surrounding Market Consultations in Innovation 
Procurement: Understanding and Addressing the Legal Risks”, (2016) EPPPL 179-182. 
Draft for the Conference Transforming Cities with AI: Law, Policy, and Ethics, 23rd November 2018, London 
Any comments welcome – Please do not circulate 
 
22.
time limits for the receipt of tenders, so that market parties that did not participate in 
the market consultation have sufficient time to come up with their solutions, which 
eliminate potential competitive advantages for economic actors who were involved in 
the preliminary discussions.52 
 
32. Gathering information and scanning the market in a transparent way is one 
thing, setting up specific projects in practice is another. The next section pinpoints the 
pivotal role of governments and the most important means for enabling these 
initiatives, namely subventions (Section IV) and procurement (Section V).  
 
IV. Second challenge: possible enabling from the (local) 
government 
 
33. Launching smart city projects often requires an active support and decision 
from government enabling this project to get out of the ground to some extent. 
Sometimes companies need to use public space to place their sensors; sometimes 
government data is needed to facilitate a project or initiative; sometimes a local 
government is needed to give it credibility. Governments then take different roles: they 
can help with launching the projects, helping to scale up ideas so that they became 
                                                 
52 CJEU, joined cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, 3rd March 2005, Fabricom SA v Belgian State, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:127 is a famous case dealing with the potential conflict of interest of market players who 
had participated in the preliminary phase of a procurement. The CJEU recognized that such players are not 
in the same situation as players who have not been part to this preliminary phase (paragraph 28). This 
market player is thus at an advantage when it comes to the procurement phase. A conflict of interest may 
then unwillingly arise from this situation as the market player may have shaped (or help to shape) “the 
conditions of the contract in a manner favourable to himself” (paragraph 30). As there is a factual difference 
for the person who has carried out preparatory work, the principle of equal treatment does not require that 
that person be treated in the same way as any other tenderer (paragraph 31). 
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financially viable on the market.53 They can facilitate/stimulate transactions to happen 
as with Transport for London which makes most of its data publicly available. Of course, 
local government can also inject money in projects as central or European institutions 
also do.54 Finance is especially needed when it comes to technological innovation such 
as the one at stake in smart city projects, because the lack of finance is often identified 
as a strong obstacle to the dissemination of technologies that would otherwise be 
available for use.55  
 
34. This section focuses on the financial support granted by local governments.56 
Under administrative law, decisions to grant financial support or subsidies need to be 
distinguished from decisions to procure goods and services, which are analyzed in the 
following section. Here arises a new “grey” zone in the decision-making leading up to 
the development of smart city projects. Indeed, the distinction between the two 
concepts is not as clear cut as it may sound. In theory, the difference is straightforward: 
subsidies or grants have a different subject matter from procurement contracts. In 
practice, lines are sometimes blurred. 
 
                                                 
53 E.g. the work of Catapult centers in the UK. 
54 This can lead to questions from the perspective of EU state aid, which falls outside the scope of this article. 
55 See this problem, sometimes called the “valley of death”: A. Alon-Beck, “The Coalition Model, a Private-
Public Strategic Innovation Policy Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the 
Era of New Economic Challenges”, (2018) 17 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 267, 267-68.  
56 Of course a lot of projects are also supported by European networks under the Horizon 2020 programme 
(for example: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/horizon-2020-what-it-is-and-how-to-apply-for-funding) and 
supra-local subsidies (for example: Transforming cities fund, launched in 2018 by the Department for 
Transport, with a budget of £1.7 billion. See Department for Transport, Transforming Cities Fund – Call for 
Proposal, Moving Britain Ahead, 2018, para 1.3). 
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35. Procurement can be defined as the purchasing of works, supplies and services 
by public bodies. It can be formally written but does not have to be. It can extend to any 
contracts including a pecuniary interest between economic operators and public bodies 
when these contracts involve the execution of works, the supply of products or the 
provision of services. These contracts can fall within private or public law in legal 
systems where this distinction exists.57 If normally, the work, supply or service is 
provided against a financial prestation, the legal arrangement including this financial 
prestation can be very diverse. 
 
36. Subsidies imply “[a] direct financial contribution, by way of donation, from the 
government budget in order to finance either an action intended to help achieve an 
objective of general interest or the functioning of a body which pursues an activity that is 
relevant for the general interest”.58 They can be granted unilaterally or by contract.59 
Procedures to grant them can vary widely depending on their subject-matter, the public 
body granting them, their amount etc. Here again appears a grey zone. The procedure 
to award subsidies are left to a wide discretion from Member States, with the Court of 
                                                 
57 CJEU, C-399/98, 12 July 2001, Scala, ECLI:EU:C:2001:401. Overall the CJEU has an extensive functional 
interpretation of the reach of procurement. 
58 Article 121 paragraph 1 alinea 1st Regulation (EU, Euratom), n°966/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) n°1605/2002. 
59 E.g. Article 121 paragraph 1 alinea 4 Regulation (EU, Euratom), n°966/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) n°1605/2002. 
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Auditors being the public body most commonly in charge to supervise their legality, 
regularity and property.60 
 
37. Normally the beneficiary of a subsidy is responsible, sole or in common with 
partners, for implementing the operation and retains ownership of its results. He 
contributes most often financially to the project. By contrast, under a procurement 
/concession contract, the (local) government is paying for and owning in principle the 
results of the project. It therefore closely supervises its implementation or alternatively 
grants a right to exploit a project to the private partner (concession).  
 
38. Furthermore, subsidies normally does not exceed the costs of the projects.61 In 
procurement, the public body pays costs and on top of this, the price includes a margin 
for profit. This is in line with the fact that procurement occurs for good and services that 
are provided in a competitive, commercial, market.62 Lines become blurred however 
because the financial part public bodies pay in procurement does not have to be 
monetary. It can also be in natura (e.g. the public body makes available grounds, offices, 
computers etc. to the private partner). Any advantage that the private partner may get 
from his work or service (e.g. through later transfer against a price) or a limitation of 
his risks may be included in this financial part.63 The EU Directive 2014/24 on public 
                                                 
60 For England, T. Daintith and A. Page, The Executive in the Constitution – Structure, Autonomy and Internal 
Control (Oxford University Press, 1999) especially pp. 193-206. To our best knowledge, the picture they 
drew remains in the main suitable to describe the situation today. 
61 This is the “no-profit principle” (see e.g. article 125 paragraph 4 Regulation (EU, Euratom), n°966/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the 
general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) n°1605/2002). 
62 In keeping with this idea, Directive 2014/24 includes provisions to exclude offers that are abnormally 
low (article 69). 
63 CJEU, C-451/08, 25 March 2010, Helmut Müller, ECLI:EU:C:2010:168. 
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procurement clarified that it did not apply to all forms of disbursement of public funds, 
but only to “those aimed at the acquisition of works, supplies or services for consideration 
by means of a public contract”.64 One important distinction between procurement and 
subsidy is the claw back term, ensuring that funds that are not used as intended in the 
subvention grants have to be returned to the local / subsidizing authority.65 In 
procurement, the contractual relationship may lead to the implementation of 
enforcement techniques that are common under public or private law, if needed 
through judicial proceedings. As these can be costly, public private partnerships (old 
style66) were known for “self-executing sanctions”, where the contracts provided 
formulas to prevent the contractor to be paid for services it did not provide to the users 
of the infrastructures.  
 
39. Deciding to grant a subvention to projects pertains to the power to spend public 
money and its limits. Different legal systems have developed different constraints to 
shape the power of public bodies to make this choice. In England, the Treasury regularly 
updates guidelines about these kind of topics.67 In Belgium, governments are only 
allowed to award subsidies if there is a specific legal basis, whereas this is not needed 
in case of public procurement contracts.   
 
                                                 
64 Preamble, recital (4) Directive 2014/24. 
65 Preamble, recital (4) in fine Directive 2014/24. This is nearly the only “stick” that the subsidizing 
authority has to ensure compliance with the terms of the grant. 
66 See above paragraph 16. 
67 HM Treasury, Managing public money (2013 with annexes revised at March 2018). For the claw back 
obligation see Annex 5.2 (Protecting the Exchequer interest). 
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40. The award of subsidies is organized by legal principles found in administrative 
law: in particular, it is subject to the principles of good governance and specific legal 
rules that may differ from public entity to public entity and from EU member state to EU 
member state. Although there is a high level of diversity across Europe, the EU financial 
regulation gives some clues as to which main concerns have to be addressed by public 
/ local bodies. It especially mentions transparency and equality68, non-cumulative 
award69 and the principle of non-retroactivity70. It also specifies general principles 
related to selection71 and evaluation.72 
 
41. Subventions provide a flexible tool for local bodies to financially support the 
development of smart cities to address societal issues arising on their territory. Local 
authorities can shape the overall direction of the smart city projects in including terms 
and conditions regarding the spending of the subventions (such as environmental 
targets, social terms or the duty to include “privacy by design” in the technology used 
etc.). They can also support in parallel different projects pertaining to smart cities on 
their territory. However, subventions can lead to difficulties for local government 
wanting to both pursue the local interest and maintain equality between market players.  
 
                                                 
68 Article 125 paragraph 1st Regulation n°966/2012. 
69 Article 129 Regulation n°966/2012. 
70 Article 130 Regulation n°966/2012. 
71 Article 132 paragraph 1st Regulation n°966/2012: “The selection criteria announced in advance in the call 
for proposals shall be such as to make it possible to assess the applicant's ability to complete the proposed 
action or work programme”. 
72 Article 133 paragraph 1st Regulation n°966/2012: “Proposals shall be evaluated, on the basis of pre-
announced selection and award criteria, with a view to determining which proposals may be financed.” 
Draft for the Conference Transforming Cities with AI: Law, Policy, and Ethics, 23rd November 2018, London 
Any comments welcome – Please do not circulate 
 
28.
42. The first challenge lies in the advertisement for subventions and ensuring that 
interested market players are aware of them at a suitable time. There is no one single 
database where all the subventions are officially advertised. It can thus depend on 
serendipity or word of mouth for market players to be made aware in due time that 
subventions are available to them. In theory, reasonably well introduced market players 
would be on the look-out for opportunities but this is not a water tight guarantee that 
equality of opportunity is respected. Of course, it may depend on local government to 
seek to target their audience well in line with their preparations. But again, this grey 
area is a spot where bias, ignorance, hope that the invisible hand of the technology 
through emails, external databases and algorithms would lead the information to be 
disseminated in the right place at the right time. This looks dubious to us. A publication 
scheme would enhance equality of opportunity. This is even more true in smart cities 
than it is for any other subventions, as currently subventions are often for ‘pilot’ projects 
and one-off projects with various schemes fragmented among a variety of funding 
providers, which means that there is no regularity in the subventions being granted, so 
that a unlucky market player may not have the opportunity to put a remainder in his 
diary for applying in the follow up round. 
 
43. The second challenge with subventions is their follow up by local government. 
Once the subvention has been granted, the local government pays a lump sum or pays 
on receiving receipts for expenses. A report of activities and about outputs may be 
expected. However, there may be little active cooperation and discussions between the 
local government and the private actors, with the private actors largely free to spend 
the money within the remit of their grants. Local government have little means to give 
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their own input and steer the course of the project as long as there is no major 
irregularity arising in the spending of taxpayers’ money.73-74 The experience from the 
public private partnerships “old-style” has also shown that it was not possible for public 
authorities to move away from controlling the implementation of the agreed terms if 
VfM had to be secured.  
 
44. This all means that subventions can provide a springboard for developing smart 
city projects and technologies or a first step to encourage various actors to come 
together around a societal issue in the local area and develop new ideas or concepts. 
Local government may want to encourage ideas and give some financial support to 
groups seeking to address local issues. It may however have to be cautious in the ways 
in which it spends the money, how to monitor the benefit resulting from the subvention 
and be wary that money flows may not lead to risks of conflict of interests, if not 
corruption.75 If local government wants to keep a closer control on the smart city 
                                                 
73 Even in that case, control can be difficult to use effectively. See in the UK, on a related topic the problems 
arising from the Kids Company. The problem is about the governance of the Charity but it also illustrates 
the problems for public bodies to follow up the money (https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-
network/2017/aug/08/kids-company-is-charity-worth-saving). The question may then revolve around 
the possibility to update the legal framework pertaining to monitoring local finances to keep up with the 
kind of funding provided to external providers such as smart cities. Equally the Public Account Committee 
has reported that there was a lack of appropriate local scrutiny when it comes to Local Enterprise 
Partnerships since the abolition of the Audit Commission (Cities and Local Growth (2016-17 HC 296) para 
22-23). Although Local Enterprise Partnerships have a cross-local government remit, they are more 
institutionalised than “smart city” projects are. Hence it might have been expected that appropriate 
accountability systems and assessment of VfM would have been set up.  
74 In general the externationalisation of “core” services to private actors has made a series of problems arise 
in practice where the actual implementation of the service had not been properly monitored by the public 
body primarily in charge of the externalised service (see e.g. the Concentrix Case: 
https://ukaji.org/2016/09/15/tax-credits-concentrix-and-privatised-administrative-justice/). 
75 Different local administrative cultures may be more or less prone to corruption risks. However if money 
flows without tights legal controls, a very strong ethical framework from all actors involved needs to be in 
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projects and/or involving the private actors in the actual public service provision, they 
are likely to select procurement to develop, steer and monitor smart cities. 
 
V. Third challenge: closing the “deal” through a suitable 
procurement route 
 
45. In a procurement or concession contract, a local government decides that 
developing a smart city project meets an actual need in the local area. It decides to start 
a procurement process to acquire the innovative goods or services matching this need. 
Most often the process is initiated by the local government itself, but even if it is by the 
private actors (what is often called “unsolicited proposals”), public procurement applies 
and a full competition needs to be organized, ensuring equal treatment among all 
private actors. Different technical routes are however open for this competition, that 
eventually will lead to a smart city project to be set up. Hence, a new grey zone appears 
on our radar: how can the local government identify the route that is most appropriate 
to deliver solutions addressing the local needs? This section maps the options most 
commonly considered options in the case of smart cities, especially with regard to the 
need to deliver “innovative” solutions for local needs. 
 
46. Choosing the appropriate route depends on a range of factors, such as the 
subject matter of the project (e.g. services or works), the level of risks to be born by the 
                                                 
place if abuse is not to follow. In this respect, “grey areas” where the ins and outs of a public decisions are 
not understood well, are at risk. The development of big data and accountability thanks to “armchair 
auditors” (i.e. local taxpayers), two factors relied on during the adoption of the Local Audit and 
Accountability Act in England in 2014, have still to demonstrate that they can be used effectively in this 
regard. 
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public and private actors respectively and the state of the art in the sector. If a local 
government has little concrete idea of the solution it is looking for, it may want to 
support innovative businesses and researchers in finding the “perfectly-suited” product 
or service. This may then lead to a step-by-step procurement, during which the needs of 
the local government become better articulated and the solutions (good, service or 
works) developed or delivered by the private actors better aligned on the local 
government’s needs. There are different configurations possible at this point to foster 
innovation. The most commonly relied on are the competitive dialogue, the innovation 
partnership, pre-commercial procurement and the setting up of a vehicle for public 
private cooperation. 
 
47. The first route open to local government is the competitive dialogue, a 
procedure especially designed for complex projects developed in England in the early 
2000s.76 It is organised around three main steps. The local government, first, organizes 
a transparent call for competition, describing its needs in a descriptive document or 
contract notice, setting the minimum requirements for candidates and defining the 
contract award criteria.77 After a preliminary verification that candidates meet the 
selection criteria, the local government initiates the competitive dialogue with the 
selected companies. In this second step, the local government holds negotiation 
                                                 
76 Article 1st, paragraph 11 (c) Directive 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts. Article 30 Directive 2014/24 does not reproduce this condition: there is no 
longer an official definition of the competitive dialogue in this directive. See also K. Haugbølle, D. Pihl and 
S. Gottlieb, “Competitive dialogue: Driving innovation through procurement?”, (2015) 21, Procedia 
Economics and Finance, 555-562; S. Arrowsmith and S. Treumer, The competitive dialogue (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
77 Article 30, paragraph 1, alinea 3 Directive 2014/24. 
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individually with each candidate, ensuring confidentiality to each of them. The dialogue 
lasts as long as needed for the local government to identify the solution capable of 
meeting its needs.78 Once the local government concludes the dialogue, it invites each 
candidate to submit their final tenders on the basis of the solution specified during the 
dialogue (third step). The contract is then awarded on the basis of the best price quality 
ratio.79 Introduced in the European directive on procurement in 2004, the competitive 
dialogue had been a promising tool to foster innovation in complex projects. It however 
encountered a series of implementation problems, such as private actors who were 
worried that public bodies would cherry pick some aspects of their suggestions. 
Furthermore, the dialogue can be very resource intense and lasts long, which renders 
this procedure costly, deterring some private actors to take part in it, hence reducing 
the competitive pressure between private actors and failing to provide good solutions 
to the public body. 
 
48. The second route open to local government to develop a smart city project is the  
innovation partnership introduced in the 2014 directive on procurement.80 In this case 
again, local government are faced with a need that would require an innovative product, 
service or work to be supplied. This product, service or work however does not appear 
                                                 
78 Article 39 paragraphs 5 and 6 Directive 2014/24. 
79 Preamble, recital (92) Directive 2014/24 explains what this “best price quality ratio” refers to (“When 
assessing the best price-quality ratio contracting authorities should determine the economic and qualitative 
criteria linked to the subject-matter of the contract that they will use for that purpose. Those criteria should 
thus allow for a comparative assessment of the level of performance offered by each tender in the light of the 
subject-matter of the contract, as defined in the technical specifications. In the context of the best price-quality 
ratio, a non-exhaustive list of possible award criteria which include environmental and social aspects is set out 
in this Directive. Contracting authorities should be encouraged to choose award criteria that allow them to 
obtain high-quality works, supplies and services that are optimally suited to their needs”). 
80 A. Castelli, “Smart Cities and Innovation Partnership” (2018) 3 EPPL 207. 
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to exist on the market, leading the local government to seek to foster its development 
thanks to a long term relationship with a private actor. Innovative partnerships have 
thus two phases: in the first phase, the private actor develops the innovative product, 
service or works to an agreed performance level; in the second phase, the local 
government purchases it against an agreed price without the need for a new 
procurement to be organised.81 There is thus a two-step procedure based on the 
restricted procedure,82 a standard procurement procedure. The result of the procedure 
is a contract containing several milestones comprising the research and development 
part (creating innovative solutions) and the supply of the newly found solution 
(supplying the innovative solution adapted to the specific needs of the public 
procurer).83  
 
49. The core of this procurement route is the innovation that is supposed to be 
generated during the first stage of the procurement. This means that local government 
have to be careful in their procurement planning to clearly identify three elements: 
firstly, selection criteria that enable them to choose the private actor best capable in the 
field of research and development and best able to supply the real scale implementation 
of the innovative solutions; secondly, contract performance clauses that enable the local 
government to monitory the performance of the contractor, to measure how well he 
                                                 
81 Preamble, recital (49) Directive 2014/24.  
82 Regulated in article 28 Directive 2014/24. It means that “any economic operator may submit a request 
to participate in response to a call for competition containing the information set out in [prior information 
notices or contract notices] by providing the information for qualitative selection that is requested by the 
contracting authority”. 
83 European Commission, Consultation document on Guidance on Public Procurement of Innovation Draft 
version to be submitted to the targeted consultation, http://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/25724 
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meets his target and thirdly, termination clauses in case the targets are not met or in 
case the market provides an alternative solution and the innovation partnership proves 
to become redundant.84 This procurement route seeks to find a delicate balance 
between three objectives that are in tensions: firstly, spurring innovation, the 
development of a new product, service or work; secondly, not tying the hands of local 
government to solutions or contracts that have become obsolete and hence would not 
contribute to the general interest; thirdly, not stifling innovation by other private actors 
who would be keen to develop competitive solutions.85 The combination of these three 
objectives leads to a sub-optimal solution: if local government can organise their escape 
from inconvenient contracts, either they will have to pay anticipatively the price for 
such an option or the private actors may be reluctant to commit too many resources to 
a contractual relationship which may appear rather tenuous. Maybe unsurprisingly 
then, it appears from anecdotical comments that the take up of the innovation 
partnerships seem low.86 
 
50. As the first two procurement routes are not fully satisfying, local government 
can also explore a possibility mentioned in the Directive 2014/24 although not 
regulated by it, namely the pre-commercial procurement, for which the commercial and 
                                                 
84 European Commission, Consultation document on Guidance on Public Procurement of Innovation Draft 
version to be submitted to the targeted consultation, http://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/25724 
85 Cfr. Preamble, recital (49) in fine Directive 2014/24. 
86 European Commission, Consultation document on Guidance on Public Procurement of Innovation Draft 
version to be submitted to the targeted consultation, http://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/25724 
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legal window are rather narrow.87 The pre-commercial procurement88 consists in 
procuring research and development services from several economic operators to 
stimulate innovation and development services.89 Here, the research and development 
usually focuses on the final stage of development of an innovative solution, just before 
its commercial deployment. Because the pre-commercial procurement is a form of 
bridge to facilitate commercialisation of a product, it  typically includes benefit sharing 
mechanisms: the local government accepts to leave the intellectual property ownership 
rights with the participating economic operators, while keeping license-free rights to 
use the research and development results and the right to (require the economic 
operators to) give licenses to third parties.90 The idea is thus that economic operators 
are able to commercialise the solutions to other public procurers or in other markets 
(breaking in new markets where their solutions may address problems that have not 
yet been satisfactorily met), while local government have the right to use the solution 
and even to license it in any follow-up procurement.  
                                                 
87 The directive provides an exemption for research and development services where the public body does 
not reserve all the benefits from the research and development contract to itself, but shares them with 
economic operators under market conditions. (Directive 2014/24, preamble, recital (47) alinea 2). 
88 Origins: Commission Communication of 14 December 2007 entitled ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: 
Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe’, COM(2007)0799; 
European Parliament resolution of 3 February 2009 on pre-commercial procurement: driving innovation 
to ensure sustainable high-quality public services in Europe (2008/2139(INI)), (2010/C 67 E/03); 
Directive 2014/24, recital (47) alinea 2 confirms that the communication continues to apply. Adding that 
“this Directive should also contribute to facilitating public procurement of innovation and help Member 
States in achieving the Innovation Union targets.” (A. Castelli, “Smart Cities and Innovation Partnership” 
(2018) 3 EPPL 208-209). 
89 A. Castelli, “Smart Cities and Innovation Partnership” (2018) 3 EPPL 209. 
90 European Commission, Consultation document on Guidance on Public Procurement of Innovation Draft 
version to be submitted to the targeted consultation, http://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/25724 
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51. Local governments increasingly use this approach to develop smart cities. 
However, they need to comply with the legal requirements set by the procurement 
directive if they want to be exempted from carrying out a proper competition. This 
means that the product, service and technology needs to be on the verge of 
commercialisation and that there is no alternative available on the market. In this way, 
local governments have to carry out suitable research in the market; they need to have 
assessed in a suitable way that their needs cannot be met by available technologies and 
that the specific technology that they will help commercialise will indeed meet them. 
This can be a very challenging test. Pre-commercial procurement is thus an extremely 
grey area that seems to be at risk to develop into a convenient pretext to circumvening 
the application of competition under the 2014/24 directive. Besides this technical point, 
there is also a real risk for local government to get committed to expensive contracts 
where the benefits will be minimal as alternative – cheap – technologies may already 
exist on the market. Many local government may not be well equipped to engage into 
leveraging new technologies. It may make more sense for a “wise” and “careful” local 
body to build on existing proven technologies.91  
 
52. These three procurement routes, namely the competitive dialogue, the 
innovation partnerships and pre-commercial procurement, all lead in many cases to the 
conclusion of one or more contracts. However, they can also be used to set up a 
corporate vehicle between the public and private actors.92 This alternative currently 
                                                 
91 C. Staropoli and B. Thition, “Smart city : Quelles relations public-privé pour rendre la ville plus intelligente 
?”, (11 september 2018) Terra Nova, 3. 
92 Commission interpretative communication on the application of Community law on Public Procurement 
and Concessions to institutionalised PPP (IPPP) (Text with EEA relevance) (2008/C 91/02); HM Treasury 
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offers a flexible solution for smart city projects.93 It especially caters for two concerns. 
The first concern relates to the need to revise and amend often contractual terms as 
smart city projects often require to do. However, the EU directive on procurement 
regulates contractual changes: in case substantial changes are made to the contract, a 
new procurement has to be started all over again, with a new competition. The second 
concern pertains to the setting up of appropriate governance structure, enabling 
monitoring of the smart city projects and their implementation. 
 
53. Yet past practice has shown that public private entities have also their own 
problems. It is not possible to change everything agreed upon in these corporate entities 
for instance.94 Principles such as equality and transparency need also to be complied 
with.  This means that changes to essential terms of the relationships between the public 
and private actors (such as the scope of the work or services) also require a new 
competition procedure to be organised. Furthermore, the governance of public private 
entities is not straightforward. On the one hand, it can lead to many conflicts of interests: 
public bodies have to pursue the local interest while private actors seek to reap profits. 
In some cases, this can be a “win-win” situation. In other cases, the two objectives are 
on a collision course. When it comes to smart city projects for instance, local 
                                                 
Guidance prepared by Partnerships UK, A Guidance Note for Public Sector Bodies forming Joint Venture 
Companies with the Private Sector, December 2001; M. Andrecka  Institutionalised Public-Private 
Partnership as a Mixed Contract under the Regime of the New Directive 2014/24/EU, (2014) EPPP, 3/174; 
C Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law, (2012) Edward Elgar, 436. 
93 Shobhan S. Kelkar, “Development of Smart Cities and role of Joint venture as a Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP): a major vehicle of resource mobilisation”, (2017) International Journal of Engineering Research and 
Technology, 1; C. Staropoli and B Thition, Smart city : Quelles relations public-privé pour rendre la ville plus 
intelligente ?, (11 september 2018) Terra Nova, 3. 
94 Commission interpretative communication on the application of Community law on Public Procurement 
and Concessions to institutionalised PPP (IPPP) (Text with EEA relevance) (2008/C 91/02). 
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government may want to retain control over the technology (or part of the technology) 
developed to address their specific needs as part of it will has been developed thanks to 
their data, workshops, brainstorming sessions etc. However, the private actors may 
want to commercialise this same technology to recoup the money and resources they 
invested in developing it. On the other hand, too cosy relationships between public and 
private actors may also be suspicious and hide some form of confusion of interest. This 
has been so much the case in Belgium in the past, that the Flemish government came to 
forbid some mixed forms of collaboration through corporate vehicles.95 Overall, 
criticisms arise about such public private vehicles as their governance may lead to a 




54. This paper started from the growing importance of smart cities. This paper 
addressed from an administrative law perspective some of the problems associated 
with the setting up of smart cities. Smart cities are  increasingly structured around 
public-private relationships. Technologies developed by private actors are more and 
more likely to play a decisive role in the policy making undertaken by local government 
to address local societal issues. This prompted scholars to warn against the increasing 
role of private actors in local governance and the risk for a "privatisation" of ownership 
                                                 
95 Article 10 Flemish Decree 6 July 2001, houdende de intergemeentelijke samenwerking provides for 
cooperation only between local public bodies as a matter of principle. Cooperation with private bodies may 
only happen in two well defined cases (in the field of energy and waste management) since 2016. S. Van 
Garsse, ”Publiek-private samenwerking op lokaal vlak: een inleiding” (2002) Tijdschrift voor 
gemeenterecht, 225-247. 
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of both infrastructure and data related to public service provision associated to 
addressing pressing local issues. This warning clearly calls for a systematic analysis of 
the ways in which power comes to become organised in these local public-private 
relationships. In 1990, a celebrated book, Government by Moonlight: The Hybrid Parts of 
the State,96 already drew the attention on the need for administrative lawyers to 
carefully map the workings and interplays between the public and private actors.  
 
55. In fact more light needs to be cast on the ways in which local government make 
their decisions in the lead up to the development of smart city projects and the ways in 
which it interacts with private actors.  This is even  more true as it becomes clearer that 
local government needs to remain in a strong position to ensure that the local interest 
is pursued. Furthermore, under the current system of representative democracy, local 
government has to be able to account for the working of their smart city projects to its 
local constituents and for the effects of these projects on their lives and daily routines.  
 
56. One needs to think about how smart city structures can be developed, facilitated 
and contained. This is necessary as the old style PPPs, based on minutely designed 
standardised contracts, do not provide an answer for smart city projects. Even more, 
one can say: they are dead – definitively so in England since the budget announcement 
in October 2018.97  
                                                 
96 By P. Birkinshaw, I. Harden and N. Lewis (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 336 p.  
97 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/budget-2018-live-updates-brexit-philip-hammond-
statement-conservative-spending-austerity-may-party-a8606316.html. 
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57. Administrative law can help to structure “new” PPPs designed to foster ethical 
cooperation between multiple actors in order to tackle transversal issues plaguing local 
areas. A careful and well thought through implementation is needed. This paper 
identified three grey areas, common to most smart city projects. In all of them 
administrative law highlights the scope of choice that local governments have when it 
comes to designing and preparing the ground for the future cooperation with private 
actors.  
 
58. The first challenge for local governments is exploring the scene, identifying the 
main relevant actors, setting up discussions with them and exploring possible solutions. 
The second challenge pertains to the fact that most often setting up smart city projects 
involves funding from local governments. The  final challenge is to select private 
partners following a suitable procurement route.  In all these three steps, local 
governments have a range of options that they have to carefully balance against each 
other : legal requirements such as public procurement rules, (financial, legal and 
political) accountability, equality among private parties  and transparency need to be 
complied with. Each choice can impact the options that will be available later on down 
the line. This paper showed that many of the options currently used in practice 
(informal market dialogue, subsidies to set up local smart partnerships, use of pre-
commercial procurement and even the recently identified institutional PPP as a solution 
for flexibility in long term partnerships) may not be the panacea. Besides addressing 
these “grey zones”, scholars from the administrative law field have to keep in mind the 
need to address the next major challenge for good local governance: designing an 
administrative law framework to organise in a flexible way public private partnerships, 
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not only a contractual relationship but also as a corporate vehicle pursuing the local 
interests in an accountable fashion. 
 
